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Abstract
In this paper, we estimate the degree of substitution between enrol-
ment into Disability Insurance (DI) and Unemployment Insurance (UI)
in the Netherlands. Starting in the 1990s many policy measures aimed
at reducing DI enrolment, and increase labour force participation. We
quantify whether these policy measures have led to a reduction in hid-
den unemployment in DI. A side effect of the reforms may be increased
pressure on UI. Therefore, we simultaneously estimate reverse substi-
tution, that is, hidden disability in UI. To this end, we employ a sample
of firms in the Dutch AVO database from the period 1993-2002. Using
instrumental variables in a bivariate Tobit specification, we identify
the hidden components in both respective schemes. The estimation
results indicate that about 3% of all dismissals took place through DI,
which implies that about one quarter of the DI enrolments observed
in our sample in fact consists of hidden unemployment. We find no
evidence for reverse substitution of disabled persons ending up in UI.
Keywords: Firm behaviour, social security, disability, employment de-
termination
JEL codes: D21,H55,I12,J2
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we address substitution between Unemployment Insurance
(UI) and Disability Insurance (DI) in the Netherlands. As in other coun-
tries, there has been much debate on this issue both by economists and
policymakers. By now, it is widely believed that the Dutch DI scheme has
contained much hidden unemployment in the past years, although empirical
estimates show quite some divergence, with estimates ranging from 10 to
50%. Yet, it is unclear how the current status has developed after the many
reforms of DI initiated by the Dutch government in the 1990s. Indeed, en-
rolment rates have slipped considerably over the years, from over 1.5% of
the workforce during the early 1990s until less than 1% in the early 2000s.
This suggests that the various policy measures taken have been effective,
or, to put it in other words, suggesting that hidden unemployment in DI
has fallen considerably. There may however be other factors at stake, such
as the business cycle, the population composition, etc. Another possible
complication is that persons who are in fact eligible to receiving DI benefits
are not receiving any as a result of a wrong decision of the medical examiner
(erroneous denials, or type I errors). It may also be the case that disabled
persons do not even apply for DI benefits as they do not have any confidence
in being admitted to the scheme. In this paper, we will first seek to invest-
igate whether hidden unemployment in DI has indeed decreased over the
years, and second, we will investigate whether there has been any reverse
substitution of disabled persons into the UI scheme.
In the relevant literature, one of the first contributions giving explicit
estimates for the degree of hidden unemployment in the Netherlands’ DI
scheme was Aarts & de Jong (1992), who used cross-section data from 1980
2
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to estimate a share of hidden unemployment within DI enrolment of 33–
51%. Westerhout (1996) used aggregate data for the period 1973-1992 and
confirms that nearly half of the persons receiving DI benefits are in fact
unemployed. The most recent study in this sequence of Hassink, van Ours
& Ridder (1997) uses micro data for the period 1988-1990, and finds a
percentage of hidden unemployment of 10. Another interesting finding is
that a quarter of the employees enrolling into DI are not replaced by new
workers, suggesting that these are, in fact, layoffs (Hassink 2000).
For other countries there exists quite some empirical evidence as well.
For the United States, both Autor & Duggan (2003) and Black, Daniel
& Sanders (2002) demonstrate that the U.S. DI scheme contains hidden
unemployment. The latter paper uses inter-state variation to show that
the recessions of 1991 and 2001 increased pressure on DI. Autor & Duggan
(2003) find that the rising replacement rates for low skilled workers led to a
higher incidence of disability. In Canada, the rise of replacement rates in all
provinces except Quebec was found to decrease the labour force participation
(Gruber 2000). An interesting recent paper by Duggan, Singleton & Song
(2005) considers the effect of the 1983 Social Security1 reform on the number
of disability recipients in the United States. The authors find that the
reduction of Social Security generosity led to increased pressure on Disability
Insurance. On the other hand, Riphahn (1997) rejects the hypothesis that
DI and UI can be considered as substitutes for German elderly workers.
Our paper adds to this literature in two ways. First, we use a recent
administrative data set with employer records on layoffs and disability enrol-
ments. During the 1990s and early 2000s, the Dutch government has almost
1Social Security is the U.S. public old age pension.
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continuously reformed the DI scheme, so that the estimates discussed above
may be outdated by now. Second, we are able not only to investigate hidden
unemployment in DI, but also the ‘reverse substitution effect’, i.e. hidden
disability in UI. Typically, substitution effects are associated with workers
entering DI as an alternative to dismissals. Within the context of our model,
however, we allow substitution to exist simultaneously in both directions.
As was just mentioned, the reverse substitution effect may have become im-
portant, because the various policy measures taken imply an increasing risk
of erroneous denials of DI admission.
We will consider a simple model of the firm, which may either dis-
miss its employees through the UI scheme and/or lose some through the
DI scheme, while allowing for substitution between the two schemes (i.e.
dismissals through the DI scheme and disabilities through the UI scheme).
The identification of the respective effects hinges on the imposition of ex-
clusion restrictions on bivariate Tobit estimates of enrolment rates in the
two schemes. In order to identify the hidden components, we impose two
sets of exclusion restrictions. Before discussing these, it should be noted
that the exclusion restrictions demand that no direct causal relation exists
between the variables and the respective enrolment rates. Given the fact
that we control both for observed and unobserved firm and worker char-
acteristics we take account of selection effects that may potentially bias
our instrumental variables estimates of the DI enrolment and UI enrolment
regressions, respectively. Our first exclusion restriction demands that the
wage level should exclusively affect UI enrolment but not DI enrolment. On
the one hand, it is intuitive that the wage level affects the layoff decision of
firms, as wages directly affect the demand for labour. On the other hand, DI
enrolment rates should not depend on such a business decision, as disability
4
Page 4 of 34
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
is typically the result of health shocks and does not result (directly) from a
change in wages. Thus, if we find that the wage level within firms affects DI
enrolment rates this indicates the presence of hidden unemployment in DI.
Second, it is assumed that UI enrolment should not be affected by function
complexity. Thus, if we find this variable to impact UI enrolment, then we
interpret this as hidden disability.
Our empirical findings point out that about 3% of all dismissals are
through the DI scheme, which implies that about one quarter of DI enrol-
ments consists of hidden unemployment. This estimate is however not very
precise compared to that in Koning & van Vuuren (2006), who employ a
much larger dataset. For practically the same period, the latter paper how-
ever finds nearly the same result with 3% of all dismissals occurring through
the DI scheme. In the second place, no evidence is found for reverse sub-
stitution between UI and DI. That is, our estimation results point out that
the many reforms taken since the 1990s have not led to increased pressure
on the UI scheme.
In section 2, we first discuss some background on the Dutch DI scheme.
In section 3 we discuss the data. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy
used in this paper. Finally, the estimation results are discussed in section 5.
2 Disability Insurance in the Netherlands
The public Disability Insurance (DI) scheme in the Netherlands was intro-
duced in 1967, and was designed to insure those workers who do not recover
from sickness within a year. Any worker is fully insured from the moment
of having a paid job, i.e. it is not required that workers have been insured
during a certain period of time prior to the moment of application for DI
5
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benefits (as is the case in most other western countries). A second feature
is that any form of disability is insured, whether stemming from profes-
sional risk or social risk. A final characteristic worth mentioning is that
applicants who lose at least 15% of their earnings capacity qualify for DI
benefits. Workers becoming disabled for 80% or more receive full benefits,
while partially disabled (15-80%) receive pro rata benefits.2
During the 1970s, enrolment rates doubled from an intial 1% of the
labour force to about 2% by the end of the decade (Figure 1). During that
time DI was widely used as an early retirement arrangement for workers who
were not able to find a job as a consequence of the international recession.
Despite the introduction of ‘official’ early retirement schemes during the late
1970s / early 1980s,3 DI enrolment rates remained stable at about 1.5% until
the early 1990s. In the mean time, the number of DI recipients had risen
from less than 3 to more than 7% of the potential workforce (Figure 1). This
development obviously put a huge financial burden on the Dutch working
population.
As a consequence of this development, many policy measures were taken.
An important reform started in 1987, when replacement rates were lowered,
and admission to DI benefits was no longer linked to the labour market situ-
ation. Before that date, labour market conditions were taken into account
in the admission decision, thus in fact facilitating hidden unemployment in
the DI scheme. However, this reform did not generate substantial effects,
and hence the 1990s saw no less than six subsequent reforms. Starting in
2Note that benefit levels are laid down in collective labour agreements, so that vari-
ation exists over different sectors / firms. Also note that, starting in 2006, the minimum
disability percentage in order to qualify for DI benefits has has been raised to 35.
3See, e.g., Euwals, van Vuuren & Wolthoff (2006) for a discussion, and evaluation of
these early retirement schemes.
6
Page 6 of 34
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
1993, admission criteria were tightened, and benefit cuts were introduced.
The latter measure however proved ineffective, as the social partners decided
to collectively ‘repair’ this by raising higher DI premiums. In 1994, finan-
cial incentives for employers were introduced to lower the use of sickness
benefits, and hence lower the inflow into DI. Those incentives comprised,
amongst others, differentiated employer premiums for sickness insurance.
In 1995, part of the 1992 reform was again lifted. The privatisation of sick-
ness insurance in 1996 made employers bear the financial risk of sickness
of their personnel. From 1998 on, premiums for DI had to be paid by the
employer instead of the employee, and these were differentiated according
to DI enrolment history (experience rating). In 1998 it was also made more
attractive for employers to hire partially disabled workers.
Finally, since 2002 both employers and employees must prove that they
have put enough effort in preventing disability during the preceding period of
sickness. If their efforts do not meet requirements, then either the employer
may have to pay additional sickness benefits (i.e. the sickness period is
extended) or the employee’s application for DI benefits may be rejected.
This measure is found to be highly effective (de Jong, Lindeboom & van der
Klaauw 2006).4
Looking at Figure 2 again, it is observed that the DI enrolment rate
shows a downward sloping trend from 1992 on. Moreover, the stock of DI
recipients stabilised at a rate slightly lower than 7% of the potential work-
force (Figure 1). Enrolment rates were at an all time low during the early
2000s. On the other hand, these were relatively high during the second half
of the 1990s. In conclusion, the time pattern since the early 1990s suggests
4Note that new reforms have taken place in 2004 and 2006, but this is beyond the scope
of this paper as our data set ends in 2002 (see section 3).
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that the various policy measures just discussed may have had important
(negative) effects on the use of DI.
[insert Figure 1 about here]
[insert Figure 2 about here]
3 Data
In this paper, we use the AVO data set of the Netherlands’ Labour Inspect-
orate which covers the period 1993-2002.5 The data are based on adminis-
trative records of firms by means of a stratified two step sampling procedure.
In the first step, a sample of firms is drawn from the Inspectorate’s own firm
register using a stratified (by industry and firm size) design. The number
of strata changes between surveys. Typically, each year’s sample contains
about 1500-2000 firms drawn from about 100-300 strata. Firms with less
than 10 workers are underrepresented, and large firms are overrepresented.
This is however not relevant for our analysis, as we aim to describe firm be-
haviour at the micro-level and the strata selection process can be considered
exogenous here.6 In the second step, a sample of workers is drawn within
each of these firms. From small firms (¡20 employees) the entire workforce
was sampled, and for larger firms, the fraction of workers who were sampled
decreases with firm size. Thus, the second step of the sampling proced-
ure provides us with extensive information on the workforce composition of
firms. In particular, we observe age, gender, education, part-time work, in-
come, function type, and function complexity distribution of the workforce.
5The acronym ‘AVO’ stands for ‘Research on terms of employment’ (in Dutch: ‘Arbeids
Voorwaarden Onderzoek’).
6Of course, when aggregate predictions are to be made on the basis of our empirical
analysis the stratified sampling scheme should be taken into account, e.g. by weighting
the observations.
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Furthermore, we observe the number of enrolments in both Disability In-
surance (DI) and Unemployment Insurance (UI) from the sampled workers.
Two important advantages of the AVO data are that we observe both worker
and firm characteristics, and that it is based on administrative records so
that we have only few missing observations.
The full dataset has 20,958 firm-year observations, of which one third
was omitted because the collective labour agreement code was not available.
We will need this last variable in order to take account of unobserved het-
erogeneity (see section 4). Furthermore, we have omitted a further 3,602
observations (17%) for which the data were incomplete. Thus, the resulting
dataset contains 10,437 obervations. Table 1 shows some characteristics of
the AVO data set. We see that the average firm has 3.4% of its person-
nel enrolled into UI, and 0.4% into DI. These figures are expressed on a
yearly basis, as each observation in our data set concerns a firm-year obser-
vation. It is striking that most firms in the sample either face positive DI
enrolment or positive UI enrolment, but that the combination of the two is
almost absent. We also calculated correlation coefficients between the two
enrolment rates. It is unclear a priori whether substitution between the two
schemes should result in a positive or a negative correlation coefficient. If,
for example, the economy is in a recession, and firing rates are high, then
substitution may imply positive correlation between both enrolment rates.
However, if we condition on the business cycle, then it is more likely that
substitution implies negative correlation. The reason is that in case of a
fixed state of the business cycle, the desired fraction of workers to be laid
off is more or less fixed, and therefore, substitution implies that a rise in the
use of one scheme will come together with a decline in the other. Table 1
indeed shows that the correlation coefficient is negative in 7 out of 8 years,
9
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suggesting that substitution might play a role. Of course, these are only
indications, and a formal proof is yet to be given.
Furthermore, Table 1 shows sample statistics concerning the workforce
composition, firm size, and year. From these figures it becomes apparent
that there exists much variation in exogenous variables among the different
firm-year observations, which will obviously be of great help in identifying
the key parameters of interest in this paper. This is particularly the case for
the variables concerning income and function complexity, as these will be
used to identify the shares of hidden unemployment and hidden disability in
DI and UI, respectively (in the next two sections we will elaborate further on
this crucial point). The observations are evenly distributed over the different
years, although no data were availabe for the years 1996 and 1999.
[insert Table 1 about here]
4 Empirical strategy
The empirical strategy employed in this paper is a generalisation of Has-
sink et al. (1997) and Koning & van Vuuren (2006). In the first stage we
estimate a bivariate Tobit model, and in the second stage the underlying
structural parameters are recovered through minimum distance estimation.
While Koning and van Vuuren only focus on hidden unemployment in Dis-
ability Insurance (DI), we will also seek to identify the level of hidden dis-
ability in Unemployment Insurance (UI). First, we discuss the model, then
we translate this into an empirical model in subsection 4.2, and finally we
will explain the estimation procedure more precisely in subsection 4.3.
10
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4.1 The model
Firms may experience incentives to dismiss employees through the DI scheme
instead of the UI scheme. For instance, making use of the unemployment
scheme may involve quite some procedural efforts, while the application for
DI benefits may be demanding less time for the employer. Also, financial
motives may play a role. While disability is not perfectly verifiable, the DI
scheme may thus be an attractive alternative to the UI scheme. On the
other hand, the many reforms of the DI scheme (see section 2) may have
led to reverse substitution, that is, disabled workers ending up in the UI
scheme. A possible reason is that disabled workers are not easily awarded
DI benefits, so that the UI scheme may be a convenient alternative.
Let us now formalise substitution between the two schemes in a simple
behavioural model for the firm. Firms have a desired dismissal rate f0 and
a ‘true’ disability rate d0. Spillovers between the DI scheme and the UI
scheme are characterised by λ (λ ≥ 0) and µ (µ ≥ 0), where the parameter
λ represents the fraction of desired layoffs that is directed to the disability
scheme, and the parameter µ the fraction of disabled which ends up in the
unemployment scheme. Hence, the observed UI and DI enrolment rates
equal
f = (1− λ)f0 + µd0 (1a)
d = (1− µ)d0 + λf0 (1b)
Clearly, our interest lies in the size of the respective components µd0 and
λf0. Dividing these components by the actual enrolment fractions f and
d yields the following expressions for the fractions of erroneous admissions
11
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into UI and DI, respectively:
s1 :=
µd0
f
= µ∗
d
f
− λ∗µ(1 + d
f
) ≈ µd
f
(2a)
s2 :=
λf0
d
= λ∗
f
d
− µ∗λ(1 + f
d
) ≈ λf
d
(2b)
where
λ∗ :=
λ
1− λ− µ and µ
∗ :=
µ
1− λ− µ.
Using the terminology of Aarts & de Jong (1992) these fractions can also be
labelled ‘type II errors’. However, these errors may be (partly) canceled out
by the opposite effect, namely workers who are wrongfully directed to the
other scheme (type I error). If type I error and type II error are of about
the same size, then the net amount of substitution between the two schemes
will come close to zero. Formally, the net fractions of hidden components in
DI and UI write as:
t1 := 1− f
0
f
= µ∗
d
f
− λ∗ ≈ µd
f
− λ (3a)
t2 := 1− d
0
d
= λ∗
f
d
− µ∗ ≈ λf
d
− µ (3b)
Comparing these equations with (2), it can be seen that the fractions of type
I error in UI and DI approximate λ and µ, respectively. Note from the above
expressions that the net substitution (in percentage points) into a given
scheme is precisely the negative of that in the other scheme (t2d = −t1f),
so that either t1 or t2 is positive while the other has to be negative.
12
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4.2 Empirical specification
Our starting point is the following empirical specification for the firm’s de-
sired layoff rate f0 and ‘true’ disability rate d0:
f0 = β′0fx0 + β
′
fxf + uf (4a)
d0 = β′0dx0 + β
′
dxd + ud (4b)
u =
uf
ud
 ∼ N (0,Σ) , with Σ =
 σ2f ρfdσfσd
ρfdσfσd σ
2
d
 (4c)
It is assumed that the incidence of layoffs and disabilities depends on firm
characteristics, worker characteristics, and the state of the economy. How-
ever, only the two latter types of variables are contained in the x-vectors; the
way to control for firm-specific characteristics is addressed in subsection 4.3.
The vector x0 contains common covariates, xf is a vector of covariates af-
fecting the desired layoff rate but not the true disability rate, and xd is a
vector of covariates affecting the true disability rate but not the desired lay-
off rate. The slope parameters of our model are organised in the β-vectors
with corresponding underscores. Both xf and xd contain a constant term.
We assume normality, and the correlation coefficient ρfd allows for some
‘natural’ correlation between f0 and d0. That is, the layoff and disability
rates may be correlated even though this needs not be a sign of substitution
between the corresponding schemes.
We may now substitute this empirical specification for f0 and d0 into (1)
to obtain an empirical specification for the observed enrolment rates into UI
13
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and DI. This yields:
f = γ′0fx0 + γ
′
ffxf + γ
′
dfxd + vf (5a)
d = γ′0dx0 + γ
′
fdxf + γ
′
ddxd + vd (5b)
v =
vf
vd
 ∼ N (0,Σv) , with Σv =
 τ2f ρvτfτd
ρvτfτd τ
2
d
 (5c)
where
γ0f = (1− λ)β0f + µβ0d (6a)
γff = (1− λ)βf (6b)
γdf = µβd (6c)
γ0d = (1− µ)β0d + λβ0f (6d)
γfd = (1− µ)βd (6e)
γdd = λβf (6f)
τ2f = (1− λ)2σ2f + µ2σ2d + 2µ(1− λ)ρfdσfσd (6g)
τ2d = (1− µ)2σ2d + λ2σ2f + 2λ(1− µ)ρfdσfσd (6h)
ρvτfτd = λ(1− λ)σ2f + µ(1− µ)σ2d + (1− λ− µ+ 2λµ)ρfdσfσd (6i)
Here τ2f , τ
2
d and ρv represent the variances, and the correlation between vf
and vd, respectively. It can be seen that for λ and µ close to zero, the
correlation coefficient ρv can be approximated by a first order Taylor series
expansion: ρv ≈ ρfd+ σfσd λ+
σd
σf
µ. This expression makes apparent that the
correlation coefficient between vf and vd has three components. The first
term relates to the correlation between the error terms in the underlying
model (‘true’ effects), whereas the second and third correspond with the
substitution parameters λ and µ. Thus, the observed correlation between the
14
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enrolment fractions into UI and DI can be decomposed into three terms: the
first one relating to some ‘natural’ correlation between unemployment and
disability (ρfd), and the second and third relating to substitution between
both schemes.
We incorporate two refinements into the model specification (5) in order
to take account of the fact that smaller firms are likely to witness more vari-
ation in their enrolment rates than larger firms. This is simply a consequence
of the law of large numbers. The enrolment rate of a firm is identical to the
average enrolment rate of the firms’ employees, and, while the law of large
numbers applies to the latter, the variance of this average decreases at the
rate of the size of the firm. Thus, we have a case for heteroscedastic error
terms depending on firm size n, which is specified as follows:
ln τf = αf + η lnn (7a)
ln τd = αd + η lnn (7b)
As is well-known, the law of large numbers predicts that η should be close
to −12 . However, other factors may impact this parameter as well. For
instance, if the (unexplained) variation in enrolment rates is larger for large
firms than for small firms, then η will be closer to zero. If indeed η > −12 ,
this may have two explanations. First, it may imply that larger firms are
more heterogeneous than smaller firms (between-firm heterogeneity), and
second, it may imply that a given large firm has a relatively fanciful course
over time of the concerning enrolment rate (within-firm heterogeneity). An
analogous reasoning obviously applies for τd.
The second refinement deals with the large share of zero observations
in our data set (see Table 1). To take account of this we will estimate
15
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(5) as a Tobit ; that is, the error terms vf and vd are (left-) censored at
−(γ′0fx0+γ′ffxf+γ′dfxd) and−(γ′0dx0+γ′fdxf+γ′ddxd), respectively. This will
be of particular relevance for smaller firms, which have a higher likelihood
of witnessing a zero enrolment rate. Note however that a Tobit version of
(5) will improve the model fit for larger firms as well, as these still face a
positive probability to observe no enrolment into DI or UI in a given year.
4.3 Estimation procedure
Our estimation procedure consists of two steps. In the first step we es-
timate (5) directly, i.e. without imposing any restrictions on coefficients.
This produces maximum likelihood estimates of the parameter vector θ0 =
(γ0f , γff , γdf , γ0d, γfd, γdd, αf , αd, η, ρv). In the second step we use these re-
duced form estimates to recover the structural parameters in θ = (β0f , βf ,
β0d, βd, σf , σd, ρfd) by Minimum Distance estimation.
In the first step, we will exploit the panel dimension of our data and
make an attempt to correct for unobserved heterogeneity through the use
of Mundlak time-averages (Wooldridge 2002). Because the panel dimension
of our data is at the level of collective labour agr ements (CLA’s) we will
only be able to control for unobserved heterogeneity insofar this is at the
CLA level. The CLA level is in some instances equivalent to the firm level,
but in other instances the CLA concerns more than one firm. However, it
is typical that multiple firms being subject to one particular CLA are much
alike. A more extensive discussion on this approach to correct for unobserved
heterogeneity is found in Koning & van Vuuren (2006). Introducing time
and CLA subscripts t and i, respectively, we thus arrive at the following
16
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model specification:
fit = max
(
0, γ′0fx0,it + γ
′
ffxf,it + γ
′
dfxd,it + cf,i + vf,it
)
(8a)
dit = max
(
0, γ′0dx0,it + γ
′
fdxf,it + γ
′
ddxd,it + cd,i + vd,it
)
(8b)
vit =
vf,it
vd,it
 ∼ N (0,Σv) , with Σv = e2ηJ(n) ·
 e2αf ρveαf+αd
ρve
αf+αd e2αd

(8c)
where
cf,i = δ0f x¯0,i + δff x¯f,i + δdf x¯d,i (9a)
cd,i = δ0dx¯0,i + δfdx¯f,i + δddx¯d,i (9b)
Here x¯·,i denotes the time average value of the vector x·,i for a given collective
labour agreement i. The log-likelihood equals
`(θ0) =
∑
i,t
[
lnφ2
(
fit − ωf,it
τf
,
dit − ωd,it
τd
, ρv
)]If,itId,it
+
lnΦ
−ωf,itτf − ρv dit−ωd,itτd√
1− ρ2v
+ lnφ(dit − ωd,it
τd
)
− ln τd
(1−If,it)Id,it
+
lnΦ
−ωd,itτd − ρv fit−ωf,itτf√
1− ρ2v
+ lnφ(fit − ωf,it
τf
)
− ln τf
If,it(1−Id,it)
+
[
lnΦ2
(
−ωf,it
τf
,−ωd,it
τd
, ρv
)](1−If,it)(1−Id,it)
, (10)
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where
ωf,it := γ′0fx0,it + γ
′
ffxf,it + γ
′
dfxd,it + δ0f x¯0,i + δff x¯f,i + δdf x¯d,i
ωd,it := γ′0dx0,it + γ
′
fdxf,it + γ
′
ddxd,it + δ0dx¯0,i + δfdx¯f,i + δddx¯d,i
τf := eαf+ηJ(n)
τd := eαd+ηJ(n)
If,it := 1{fit > 0}
Id,it := 1{dit > 0}.
Optimisation of this log-likelihood function over θ0 = (γ0f , γff , γdf , γ0d, γfd,
γdd, αf , αd, η, ρv). produces consistent parameter estimates.
In the second step we make use of exclusion restrictions to identify the
parameters λ and µ. Looking at (6), it can be easily seen that βf needs
to have at least one element in order to identify λ. The same reasoning
holds for βd and µ. Thus, the fact that we are able to make use of variables
exclusively affecting one of the two enrolment rates allows us to identify the
level of substitution. In the next section we will further discuss the variables
on which exclusion restrictions are imposed. For a more extensive discussion
of this identification strategy the reader is referred to Koning & van Vuuren
(2006).
Now let us rewrite the restrictions shown in equation (6) as g(θ) = θ0.
Note that these equations do not include any restrictions on the heteros-
cedasticity parameter η, which means that we implicitly assume that the
heteroscedastic component in τf and τd defined in (7) carries over to the er-
ror terms in the original model in (4c). Now, Minimum Distance estimation
18
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of θ is equivalent to minimising
Ψ(θ) = [θˆ0 − g(θ)]Σˆ−1v [θˆ0 − g(θ)]′, (11)
where θˆ0 is the maximum likelihood estimate of the reduced form model
based on (10), and Σˆ−1v is the associated covariance matrix. The resulting
parameter estimates θˆ are consistent and asymptotically normally distrib-
uted with covariance matrix
Cˆ = [ Γˆ′Σˆ−1v Γˆ ]
−1
where Γˆ = [∂g(θ)∂θ′ ]θ=θˆ (Chamberlain 1984). Minimisation of (11) takes place
using the same routines as regular Maximimum Likelihood estimation. The
likelihood is then defined as −Ψ(θ), and the number of observations and the
number of parameters equal dim(θ0) and dim(θ), respectively.
5 Estimation results
5.1 Reduced form parameters
Maximum Likelihood estimation results for the reduced form model (8) are
shown in Table 2. Apart from firm size, year, and workforce composition
variables, we have also included time averaged variables per collective labour
agreement in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Looking at
the coefficient estimates, firm size appears to be an important determinant
both of UI and DI enrolment. The concerning dummy variables show a
monotonic pattern, with large firms facing higher enrolment rates into both
schemes than small firms. As expected, firm size also affects the variability
of enrolment rates (η), with small firms facing more variability than large
19
Page 19 of 34
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
firms. This variability however decreases less quickly for larger firms than
would be expected on grounds of the law of large numbers, implying that
either large firms have relatively volatile enrolment rates or large firms are
more heterogeneous than small firms. Furthermore, it is found that firms
with relatively few females in their ranks face higher UI enrolment rates.
On the other hand, the DI enrolment rate does not seem to be affected by
the gender composition of the firm’s workforce.
Firms with relatively many elderly workers face lower UI and DI enrol-
ment. UI enrolment is lower in firms with relatively many workers over age
50, and for DI enrolment this holds for firms with relatively many work-
ers over age 60. A probable reason for this finding is that official early
retirement schemes act as substitutes for UI and DI (Woittiez, Lindeboom
& Theeuwes 1994, Kerkhofs, Lindeboom & Theeuwes 1999). Furthermore,
a positive effect on DI enrolment is found for firms with relatively many
workers in the ages between 30 and 60. We may thus conclude that firms
with relatively many young workers (under age 30) and old workers (over
age 60) face lower DI enrolment rates than other firms.
Firms with a large share of part-time workers working less than 20 hours
per week have significantly higher enrolment rates in both schemes. How-
ever, we were not able to include time-averages of these variables due to
limited variation over time, so that selection effects may play a role (i.e. un-
healthy workers select themselves into part-time jobs). The same applies for
the educational composition: the higher educated probably prefer less risky
jobs in terms of becoming disabled. Thus, the negative signs found for a
higher educated workforce with respect to DI enrolment does not necessarily
imply a lower risk of this group.
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[insert Table 2 about here]
5.2 Structural parameters
As was considered in the previous section, the estimation results just dis-
cussed can be used to obtain estimates of structural parameters by means
of Minimum Distance estimation (MDE). To this end, we have to impose
at least two exclusion restrictions. That is, we should have at least one
instrumental variable affecting DI enrolment but not UI enrolment, and at
least one instrumental variable affecting UI enrolment but not DI enrolment.
(This is easily observed from equation (6): if γff , γdf , γfd, and γdd would
be zero, then λ and µ could not be identified.) Our exclusion restrictions
therefore demand that no direct causal relation exists between the instru-
mental variables and the concerning enrolment rates. If there might exist
some spurious correlation then this is no problem, because we correct both
for observed and unobserved heterogeneity. The latter occurs through the
inclusion of time averaged variables in the model (cf. equation (9)). Our
first exclusion restriction is in line with Koning & van Vuuren (2006), and
assumes the wage distribution of the firms’ employees not to affect their dis-
ability risk. The rationale behind this exclusion restriction is that the layoff
decision of a firm is influenced by the wage level of its employees, in partic-
ular its relation to the productivity level. On the other hand, the ‘health
shock’ leading to disability does not reasonably depend on the wage level
of employees. Therefore, the finding in Table 2 that higher wages imply a
higher incidence of DI enrolment is an indication of hidden unemployment.
Additionally, we postulate that function complexity exclusively affects
disability risk. For instance, it could be expected that workers with relatively
simple duties have a higher risk of becoming disabled. On the other hand,
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there is no reason to expect that the risk of unemployment is modified at
different function complexity levels, given that the education level, the wage
distribution, and other relevant factors are controlled for.
The results of the MDE routine are shown in Table 3. It is observed that
the coefficients other than those used for identifying the structural paramet-
ers remain largely unaffected by the MDE routine, so that the discussion of
the previous subsection still applies here. The correlation between the ‘true’
layoff and disability rate (ρfd) could not be identified within the estimation
routine, and was found using a grid search. As can be read from the table,
the optimal value for this variable equals 0, indicating that all correlation
found between DI and UI can be explained by substitution effects. That is,
no ‘natural correlation’ between UI and DI is found. Turning to the estim-
ates of the structural parameters we are mostly interested in, we observe
that a fraction of 3% of all desired dismissals is through the DI scheme (λ).
On the one hand this may look like a low figure, but then it should be taken
into account that enrolment rates in UI are usually higher than in DI. Thus,
if we apply equation (2b), it is seen that the figure of 3% translates into a
share of hidden unemployment in DI enrolment of 26%. On the contrary,
we find no evidence for hidden disability in the unemployment scheme (µ).
Hence, based on our point estimates the conclusion is that about a quarter
of DI inflow is in fact hidden unemployment, while there is no evidence for
reverse substitution. It is however noted that our point estimate for λ is
surrounded by quite a wide confidence interval.
[insert Table 3 about here]
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6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we presented a model framework which allows us to estim-
ate the amount of substitution between Disability Insurance (DI) and Un-
employment Insurance (UI). In this model, a firm may either dismiss its
employees through the UI scheme and/or lose some of its workers through
the DI scheme, while allowing for substitution between both schemes in
both directions. More specifically, a fraction of the desired dismissals may
take place through the DI scheme, and a fraction of the disabled workers
may end up in the UI scheme. The identification of these two respective
fractions follows by the imposition of exclusion restrictions on certain vari-
ables, i.e. we assume these variables to affect one enrolment rate but not
the other. In this paper we assumed that the firm’s wage distribution ex-
clusively affects UI enrolment, as their is no obvious explanation for health
shocks to be correlated with wages, given that we correct for both firm and
worker (observed and unobserved) heterogeneity. Note that Koning & van
Vuuren (2006) have checked the robustness of this exclusion restriction by
comparing outcomes with other plausible exclusion restrictions, and found
no substantial differences between the alternative sets of instrumental vari-
ables. Our second exclusion restriction demands that function complexity
should not affect the firm’s UI enrolment rate given that we control for firm
heterogeneity.
Using the approach just outlined, we have estimated the degree of substi-
tution between DI and UI in the Netherlands for the period 1993-2002. To
this end, we employed an administrative data set of the Netherlands’ Labour
Inspectorate. Our estimation results indicate that about 3% of firms’ layoffs
take place through the DI scheme, which implies that about one quarter
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of the DI enrolments observed in our sample was in fact hidden unemploy-
ment. This figure is low compared to the earlier estimates of Aarts & de Jong
(1992) and Westerhout (1996), but somewhat higher than that of Hassink
et al. (1997). Anyhow, our point estimates suggest that hidden unemploy-
ment in DI was still relevant during the 1990s and early 2000s. Our data
have however not allowed us to perform estimations for separate years, so
as to uncover any time pattern in this level of hidden unemployment. Using
an alternative dataset, Koning & van Vuuren (2006) managed to do this,
and found that the level of hidden unemployment in DI has substantially
decreased over the years.
The large number of policy measures taken during the 1990s were to a
large extent meant to reduce erroneous admissions (or type II errors) into
DI. However, as is known from statistical theory, the reduction of type II
errors implies a greater risk of making type I errors, i.e. erroneous denials.
In this study we did however not find any evidence for hidden disability
in UI. Note that with respect to the 2002 reform (see section 2) a similar
finding was established in de Jong et al. (2006): the reform proved effective
in terms of reducing DI inflow but no additional UI inflow was found.
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Tables and figures
Figure 1: Yearly DI and UI enrolment rates (source: UWV, CBS, own
calculations)
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Figure 2: DI and UI recipients (source: UWV, CBS, own calculations)
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Table 1: Sample statistics AVO-data set, n=10437
Mean Std.dev. Minimum Maximum
UI enrolment 3.4% 7.6% 0% 100%
DI enrolment 0.4% 1.9% 0% 50%
UI enr. = 0; DI enr. = 0 96.2%
UI enr. > 0; DI enr. = 0 3.4%
UI enr. = 0; DI enr. > 0 0.4%
UI enr. > 0; DI enr. > 0 0.0%
ρ ( UI enr. , DI enr. ) -0.023
” in 1993 -0.011
” in 1994 0.180
” in 1995 -0.009
” in 1997 -0.011
” in 1998 -0.039
” in 2000 -0.022
” in 2001 -0.051
” in 2002 -0.038
Workforce composition
Age
15-29 0.35 0.27 0 1
30-39 0.28 0.19 0 1
40-49 0.22 0.18 0 1
50-59 0.13 0.15 0 1
>=60 0.01 0.05 0 1
Gender
Female 0.36 0.33 0 1
Education
Primary 0.08 0.18 0 1
Lower secondary 0.59 0.32 0 1
Upper secondary 0.25 0.25 0 1
Tertiary 0.09 0.16 0 1
Part-time work
less than 20 hours 0.30 0.25 0 1
20-32 hours 0.09 0.15 0 1
32 hours or more 0.61 0.30 0 1
Income (Ln)a
First Quartile 6.37 2.53 0 9.22
Third Quartile 8.01 0.61 0 9.75
a The logarithmic transformation is used for variables related to income.
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Table 1: Sample statistics AVO-data set (continued)
Mean Std.dev. Minimum Maximum
Workforce composition (continued)
Function type
Production, technical,
manual labour 0.40 0.38 0 1
Administrative 0.11 0.16 0 1
Automation 0.01 0.04 0 1
Commercial 0.13 0.27 0 1
Care, service 0.29 0.37 0 1
Creative 0.01 0.07 0 1
Managerial 0.06 0.08 0 1
Function complexity
Very basic 0.06 0.16 0 1
Basic 0.20 0.28 0 1
Less basic 0.41 0.33 0 1
Difficult 0.24 0.26 0 1
Complex 0.08 0.14 0 1
Lower executive 0.02 0.06 0 1
Middle executive 0.00 0.01 0 0.36
Firm size
1-4 employees 0.21 0.41 0 1
5-9 employees 0.18 0.38 0 1
10-19 employees 0.16 0.37 0 1
20-49 employees 0.15 0.35 0 1
50-99 employees 0.10 0.30 0 1
100-199 employees 0.08 0.27 0 1
200-499 employees 0.08 0.27 0 1
500 employees or more 0.05 0.22 0 1
Year Dummies
1993 0.12 0.33 0 1
1994 0.13 0.34 0 1
1995 0.11 0.32 0 1
1997 0.12 0.32 0 1
1998 0.12 0.32 0 1
2000 0.12 0.32 0 1
2001 0.16 0.36 0 1
2002 0.12 0.32 0 1
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Table 2: Estimation results for whole sample (1993-2002): reduced form
parameters of Bivariate Tobit model for UI and DI enrolment
UI enrolment DI enrolment
Coefficient St.error Coefficient St.error
Age 30-39 0.002 0.011 0.039 0.013
Age 40-49 -0.012 0.012 0.050 0.013
Age 50-59 -0.057 0.014 0.055 0.015
Age ≥60 -0.188 0.049 -0.037 0.053
Female -0.038 0.011 -0.004 0.011
Lower secondary -0.001 0.011 -0.035 0.009
Upper secondary -0.011 0.013 -0.041 0.011
Tertiary -0.006 0.017 -0.047 0.015
Less than 20 hours 0.077 0.014 0.058 0.017
20-32 hours -0.009 0.016 0.009 0.018
First Quartile ln(wage) -0.015 0.001 -0.002 0.001
Third Quartile ln(wage) 0.018 0.003 0.021 0.007
Administrative 0.013 0.011 -0.030 0.013
Automation -0.034 0.046 -0.049 0.041
Commercial -0.015 0.009 -0.008 0.009
Care, service 0.014 0.006 -0.008 0.006
Creative -0.035 0.023 -0.015 0.026
Managerial 0.038 0.023 0.066 0.022
Basic 0.042 0.014 -0.008 0.015
Less basic 0.040 0.014 -0.007 0.014
Difficult 0.056 0.015 0.000 0.016
Complex 0.082 0.020 -0.027 0.021
Lower executive 0.127 0.037 -0.045 0.034
Middle executive -0.010 0.125 -0.087 0.120
5-9 employees 0.040 0.009 0.052 0.010
10-19 employees 0.076 0.009 0.091 0.010
20-49 employees 0.110 0.009 0.126 0.010
50-99 employees 0.139 0.009 0.175 0.010
100-199 employees 0.152 0.008 0.190 0.011
200-499 employees 0.164 0.008 0.200 0.011
≥ 500 employees 0.145 0.008 0.210 0.011
Year = 1994 -0.149 0.009 -0.006 0.006
Year = 1995 -0.154 0.010 -0.019 0.007
Year = 1997 0.026 0.006 -0.012 0.007
Year = 1998 0.028 0.006 -0.014 0.006
Year = 2000 -0.003 0.006 -0.012 0.007
Year = 2001 0.157 0.006 -0.015 0.006
Year = 2002 0.142 0.007 -0.001 0.007
31
Page 31 of 34
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
Table 2: Estimation results for whole sample (1993-2002): reduced form
parameters of Bivariate Tobit model for UI and DI enrolment (continued)
UI enrolment DI enrolment
Coefficient St.error Coefficient St.error
Time averages
Age 30-39 0.089 0.043 0.155 0.033
Age 40-49 0.036 0.035 0.125 0.033
Age 50-59 0.083 0.039 0.016 0.041
Age ≥60 -0.170 0.139 0.194 0.119
Female 0.018 0.013 0.000 0.013
First Quartile ln(wage) 0.015 0.002 0.012 0.003
Third Quartile ln(wage) 0.002 0.010 -0.010 0.012
Basic 0.010 0.032 0.084 0.031
Less basic 0.005 0.026 0.024 0.024
Difficult -0.028 0.029 0.002 0.027
Complex -0.040 0.036 0.017 0.036
Lower executive -0.108 0.065 -0.002 0.071
Middle executive -0.114 0.268 0.128 0.225
Other model parameters
Constant -0.457 0.083 -0.503 0.091
τf 0.204 0.004
τd 0.150 0.004
ρv 0.015 0.029
η -0.171 0.003
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Table 3: Estimation results for whole sample (1993-2002): structural para-
meters of Bivariate Tobit model for UI and DI enrolment
UI enrolment DI enrolment
Coefficient St.error Coefficient St.error
Age 30-39 0.010 0.012 0.048 0.014
Age 40-49 -0.006 0.013 0.050 0.013
Age 50-59 -0.054 0.014 0.063 0.016
Age ≥60 -0.191 0.052 -0.034 0.056
Female -0.044 0.011 -0.009 0.012
Lower secondary 0.007 0.011 -0.036 0.010
Upper secondary 0.002 0.013 -0.040 0.011
Tertiary 0.025 0.016 -0.046 0.015
less than 20 hours 0.073 0.016 0.041 0.017
20-32 hours -0.015 0.017 0.008 0.018
First Quartile ln(wage) -0.016 0.001
Third Quartile ln(wage) 0.019 0.003
Administrative 0.016 0.012 -0.029 0.013
Automation -0.029 0.047 -0.048 0.041
Commercial -0.011 0.009 -0.007 0.009
Care, service 0.016 0.007 -0.009 0.006
Creative -0.035 0.023 0.001 0.026
Managerial 0.063 0.024 0.073 0.024
Basic 0.053 0.030
Less basic 0.047 0.022
Difficult 0.028 0.025
Complex 0.019 0.032
Lower executive -0.007 0.055
Middle executive -0.216 0.231
5-9 employees 0.041 0.011 0.053 0.012
10-19 employees 0.080 0.015 0.091 0.016
20-49 employees 0.114 0.018 0.126 0.020
50-99 employees 0.145 0.024 0.174 0.025
100-199 employees 0.158 0.025 0.190 0.027
200-499 employees 0.173 0.026 0.198 0.028
≥500 employees 0.152 0.026 0.209 0.028
Year = 1994 -0.159 0.012 -0.002 0.010
Year = 1995 -0.160 0.013 -0.015 0.011
Year = 1997 0.027 0.006 -0.012 0.007
Year = 1998 0.029 0.007 -0.014 0.006
Year = 2000 -0.002 0.006 -0.010 0.007
Year = 2001 0.162 0.010 -0.014 0.010
Year = 2002 0.146 0.010 -0.016 0.009
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Table 3: Estimation results for whole sample (1993-2002): structural para-
meters of Bivariate Tobit model for UI and DI enrolment (continued)
UI enrolment DI enrolment
Coefficient St.error Coefficient St.error
Time averages
Age 30-39 0.076 0.047 0.150 0.036
Age 40-49 0.035 0.038 0.136 0.037
Age 50-59 0.077 0.041 -0.004 0.041
Age ≥60 -0.178 0.144 0.235 0.120
Female 0.019 0.013 0.008 0.013
First Quartile ln(wage) 0.016 0.002 0.010 0.003
Third Quartile ln(wage) -0.002 0.010 0.002 0.012
Basic 0.053 0.030 0.083 0.032
Less basic 0.047 0.022 0.023 0.024
Difficult 0.028 0.025 0.004 0.027
Complex 0.019 0.032 0.010 0.036
Lower executive -0.007 0.055 -0.005 0.070
Middle executive -0.216 0.231 0.151 0.223
Other model parameters
Constant -0.441 0.103 -0.431 0.107
σf 0.211 0.011
σd 0.153 0.012
ρfd 0.000 -
λ 0.030 0.049
µ 0.000 0.085
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